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Abstract: Gambling is considered a public health issue by many researchers, similar to 
alcohol or obesity. Statistical risk warnings on gambling products can be considered a public 
health intervention that encourages safer gambling while preserving freedom of consumer 
choice. Statistical risk warnings may be useful to gamblers, given that net gambling losses are 
the primary driver of harm, and that gambling products vary greatly in the degree to which 
they facilitate losses. However, there is some doubt as to whether statistical risk warnings are, 
in their current form, effective in reducing gambling harm. Here we consider current 
applications and evidence, discuss product-specific issues around a range of gambling 
products, and suggest future directions. Our primary recommendation is that current 
statistical risk warnings can be improved and also applied to a wider range of gambling 
products. Such an approach should help consumers to make more informed judgments, and 
potentially encourage gambling operators to compete more directly on the relative “price” of 
gambling products. 
 








Many researchers recommend treating gambling as a public health issue, a perspective 
that encompasses a wide spectrum of interventions to reduce the population’s exposure to the 
risk of gambling-related harm (Bowden-Jones, Dickson, Dunand, & Simon, 2019; Browne et 
al., 2016; Orford, 2019; van Schalkwyk, Cassidy, McKee, & Petticrew, 2019; Wardle, Reith, 
Langham, & Rogers, 2019). Warning labels are a class of intervention that have been used 
across several public health domains, such as warnings about alcohol content and safe 
consumption limits, and calorie labelling on food packaging. In both these other domains, 
warning labels are combined with other public health interventions, including restrictions on 
price and product availability (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2007). For example, in 2018 
the UK introduced a tax on sugary beverages (Thornton, 2018), which aimed to increase the 
price and discourage the consumption of drinks with the highest sugar content levels. In 
gambling, a recent example of a restrictive public health intervention is a reduction of the 
maximum bet on UK electronic gambling machines from £100 to £2 a spin (Casey, 2018). 
By comparison, warning labels are a public health intervention that does not restrict 
consumer choice (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2007). Better product-relevant information, 
such as a red traffic light label indicating that a food product is high in calories (VanEpps, 
Downs, & Loewenstein, 2016) or has poor nutritional content (Kanter, Vanderlee, & 
Vandevijvere, 2018), can inform and guide consumer choice toward relatively safer options. 
Better consumer information can also potentially shape product development, as it 
encourages firms to provide products that will look attractive under the labelling system, such 
as healthy salads. For example, the introduction of color-coded energy performance 
certificates for UK homes has provided sellers with greater incentive to invest in energy 
improvements (Comerford, Lange, & Moro, 2016). In UK gambling, the academic advisory 




and consistent provision of warning labels could form one key metric in a proposed safer 
gambling operator league table (Advisory Board for Safer Gambling, 2020).  
By comparison to the examples from the previous paragraph, many current gambling 
warning labels do not provide consumers with information that can yield an informed 
comparison of relevant products. Some warning labels are extremely generic, e.g. in Australia 
“Gamble responsibly,” in the UK, “When the fun stops, stop,” or in Ontario, “Play smart.” 
These labels provide little information to meaningfully guide consumers (Newall, Walasek, 
Singmann, & Ludvig, 2019) and might be ignored due to sheer repetition of content (Lole et 
al., 2019). Other gambling warning labels warn gamblers only about the product they are 
currently using, an approach that has been most consistently applied to electronic gambling 
machines (Ginley, Whelan, Pfund, Peter, & Meyers, 2017; McGivern, Hussain, Lipka, & 
Stupple, 2019; Wohl, Parush, Kim, & Warren, 2014). This product-specific approach fails to 
enable informed comparisons of relevant products by not providing comparable cross-product 
information.  
The rest of this article considers the issue of statistical risk warnings in gambling, an 
approach specifically designed to enable cross-product comparisons of product risk. First, 
underlying conceptual similarities between the approach suggested here will be compared 
with current public health approaches toward alcohol and food. The next section introduces 
the conceptual similarity between standard drink and calorie labelling with the theoretical 
loss in gambling, while emphasizing issues unique to gambling. The rest of the article 
reviews theoretical loss in gambling, using two economically-significant products of 
electronic gambling machines and sports betting as examples of a distinction that has 
previously been made between non-skilled and skilled gambling (Turner, Fritz, & Mackenzie, 
2003). In each case we will begin with current knowledge around statistical risks and their 




specific issues, as given gambling products do raise unique issues regarding the 
communication of theoretical loss. Each section then provides recommendations for further 
product-specific research. A Discussion section then concludes, with the argument that a 
consistent and behaviourally-informed approach to statistical risk warnings in gambling can 
provide one input to a multidimensional public health approach to gambling (Bowden-Jones 
et al., 2019; Browne et al., 2016; Orford, 2019; van Schalkwyk et al., 2019; Wardle et al., 
2019).  
Product labelling on alcohol and food packaging 
Alcohol labelling is one closely-related approach from related public health domains 
to the statistical risk warnings proposed here for gambling products. All alcohol products 
contain some amount of pure ethanol. A higher total consumption of pure ethanol exposes the 
consumer to greater risk of alcohol-related harm. In some jurisdictions this is communicated 
primarily through the percentage concentration of alcohol, called alcohol-by-volume (ABV). 
In theory, a consumer could multiply the ABV of what they are drinking with the total 
amount drunk to derive an estimate of their consumption of pure ethanol.  
However, some metrics aim to perform this concentration by volume calculation for 
consumers. A given amount of pure ethanol is communicated as a given number of “standard 
drinks” in the US and Australia or as a “unit” of alcohol in the UK. These metrics allow 
consumers to easily compare the consumption of a glass of wine with a larger but less 
concentrated glass of beer -- products varying both in terms of concentration and volume of 
ethanol (Hobin et al., 2017). Effective communication of product risk always involves 
elements of consumer psychology. The field of alcohol research continues to debate how to 
best communicate product risk, by providing simple and effective heuristics that are 




communication more broadly (Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2017), it has been argued that 
graphical aides could help drinkers to better comprehend this information than the ABV and 
standard drink information in current use (Blackwell, Drax, Attwood, Munafò, & Maynard, 
2018). 
Front-of-pack food labels inform customers about the overall energy content 
(calories) and the nutritional composition of food products. Early reviews of food labelling 
observed that many consumers feel confused and overwhelmed by the wealth of information 
found on nutrition labels (Campos, Doxey, & Hammond, 2011; Cowburn & Stockley, 2005).  
In an attempt to improve people’s understanding of the healthiness of different foods, the UK 
has adopted  “traffic light” warning labels, which use green, amber and red colors to highlight 
the relative amount of fat, saturates, sugars ,and salt in 100 grams of a given food product 
(Kanter et al., 2018). Some experimental research has indicated that summarizing calorie 
information via a traffic light system can nudge consumers toward healthier food choices 
(VanEpps et al., 2016), in an effect that is not substantively improved via the added provision 
of numerical calorie counts (Downs, Wisdom, & Loewenstein, 2015). Overall, the weight of 
evidence across restaurant and supermarket settings (Bleich et al., 2017; Dubois et al., 2020; 
VanEpps, Roberto, Park, Economos, & Bleich, 2016) suggests that food labelling, either 
graphic or numeric, can have some beneficial effects on food choices. Although measurable, 
these effects are also limited, suggesting that other approaches are needed in conjunction in a 
public health approach toward obesity (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2007). 
Theoretical loss in gambling 
Theoretical loss is the statistical average result that occurs from any given gambling 
scenario. Different gambling products can present unique challenges with respect to the 




vast majority of gamblers with some implied theoretical loss embedded. Roulette is a 
relatively simple gambling game that can be used to demonstrate the principle of theoretical 
loss. European roulette wheels have 18 black slots, 18 red slots, and one green slot. A $10 bet 
on either black or red will win $10 profit if the roulette ball ends up in a slot of that color and 
will otherwise return nothing. Theoretical loss is calculated by multiplying the payoff of each 
outcome by its probability. Since each slot is equally likely, a $10 bet will on average lose the 
gambler 18/37*$10+19/37*-$10=-$0.27. Over time, gamblers’ losses on European roulette 
will converge toward 2.7% of all money bet, which is known as the “house-edge.” If they 
make 50 such bets over the course of an hour, then the average cost of this entertainment 
activity is $13.50 per hour.  
Theoretical loss can therefore be expressed as follows: 
Theoretical loss = house-edge * total amount bet 
Although much gambling is motivated by the thrill of the potential of winning, in the 
long run all gamblers exposed to a positive house-edge will lose money, due to the statistical 
law of large numbers (Dekking, Kraaikamp, Lopuhaä, & Meester, 2005). Of relevance to 
statistical risk warnings in gambling, theoretical loss can therefore be applied to all gambling 
products, and is a useful metric for product harm, given that actual losses are a reliable 
predictor of gambling-related harm (Markham, Young, & Doran, 2014; Markham, Young, & 
Doran, 2016). Furthermore, the provision of transparent pricing information could foster 
competition in product offerings with potential longer-term benefits to gamblers. The 
theoretical loss of any gambling transaction represents the expected “price” that is paid by the 
gambler over the long term. Currently, the true cost of gambling is obscured to gamblers, 
who naturally attend to the ‘noisy’ short-run sequences of their wins and losses. Making 




operators with more incentive to compete on price. However, there are at least two major 
challenges to employing theoretical loss for gambling product warnings.  
First, some gambling forms, such as electronic gambling machines, are not consumed 
in discrete units of consumption, like a bottle of beer, but can be gambled on continuously, 
with re-staking of winnings. This can make theoretical loss difficult to calculate, which also 
depends on the speed, stakes, and time spent gambling. These challenges may make it 
simpler to communicate statistical gambling risk via the house-edge, which is conceptually 
related to the ABV in alcohol. 
Second, the volatility of gambling means that theoretical loss is only a relevant 
statistic in the long-run, and short-run results may differ from this statistic. Gambling 
products with a highly-skewed payoff schedule converge surprisingly slowly to their average 
expected return (Browne, Rockloff, Blaszcynski, Allcock, & Windross, 2015). By 
comparison, the calories in a cheeseburger are consumed with certainty. Gamblers may 
simply be paying more attention to their short-run wins and losses than the long-run 
implications of their bets. Some preliminary data suggests that a qualitative warning about the 
volatility of gambling may serve as a useful addition to a numerical statistical risk warning 
(Newall, Walasek, & Ludvig, 2020c). 
Theoretical loss in non-skilled gambling 
A non-skilled gambling game is one in which chance is the only determinant of long-
term outcomes, where gamblers do not have any real ability to learn a better strategy over 
time, or to apply skill (Turner et al., 2003). The house-edge input to theoretical loss can 
therefore be calculated with precision in non-skilled gambling games, making these an easier 
introduction to the topic of statistical risk warnings than skilled gambling games. Roulette, 




are all non-skilled games (Turner et al., 2003), although some electronic gambling machines 
that now introduce a small element of skill are being brought to market (Delfabbro, King, & 
Gainsbury, 2019).  
Current knowledge 
The house-edge of electronic gambling machine games can be altered in a way which 
is not immediately obvious to gamblers (Schüll, 2012). A natural question therefore is 
whether gamblers can by themselves detect differences in the house-edge across seemingly 
identical games. A laboratory study involving a long period of 60 hours of play found that 
gamblers could discriminate between two identical games with radically different house-
edges of 2% and 15% (Dixon, Mike J., Fugelsang, MacLaren, & Harrigan, 2013). However, 
in most electronic gambling machine environments there will be many potential games on 
offer, and so 60 hours of play across two games may not correspond to the typical gambler’s 
experience. Indeed, field studies conducted on casino floors suggest that gamblers cannot 
differentiate between differences of up to 8.9% in the house-edge on seemingly identical 
games, a differential that can have a marked impact on the actual long-term losses 
experienced by players (Lucas & Spilde, 2019). This suggests that electronic machine 
gamblers may benefit from well-designed statistical risk warnings. 
In the UK, statistical risk information is provided for electronic gambling machines 
(Gambling Commission, 2012), albeit hidden far down on help screens which most regular 
machine gamblers have never even seen (Collins, Green, d'Ardenne, Wardle, & Williams, 
2014). In addition, the information is communicated both in the UK and other jurisdictions 
such as Australia (Beresford & Blaszczynski, 2019) via the “return-to-player” percentage, 




been suggested (Eggert, 2004), the return-to-player is an inefficient risk communication 
metric compared to the house-edge. 
 A return-to-player of 90% is equivalent to a house-edge of 10%, since in both cases 
10% of all money bet is on average lost (Parke, Parke, & Blaszczynski, 2016). In practice, 
return-to-player information might be communicated via the label, “This game has an 
average percentage payout of 90%”, a statement which only six out of 20 regular gamblers 
could interpret correctly in one study: “For every £100 bet on this game about £90 is paid out 
in prizes” (Collins et al., 2014). Some results show that gamblers display a better 
understanding of this information when it is given in terms of the house-edge. Specifically, 
66.5% of gamblers correctly understood a house-edge statement of, “This game keeps 10% of 
all money bet on average,” compared to 45.6% of those given a return-to-player statement 
(Newall, Walasek, & Ludvig, 2020a). Furthermore, gamblers perceived a lower chance of 
winning when given house-edges of between 5 and 15% than when given equivalent return-
to-player statements ranging from 95 to 85% (Newall et al., 2020a). Taken together, these 
results imply that gamblers have a more informed and less optimistic interpretation of the 
winning chances when given house-edge information compared to the more widely-used 
return-to-player information.  
However, these results pertain only to the house-edge, rather than the theoretical loss, 
which is the product of the house-edge and the total amount bet. Some preliminary evidence 
suggests that gamblers’ perceived chances of winning in a hypothetical scenario do not differ 
when the house-edge is instead restated in terms of the theoretical loss, e.g., “This game 
keeps £10 for every £100 bet on average” (Newall, Walasek, & Ludvig, 2020b). Personalized 
theoretical loss information, however, which reflects a gambler’s stakes and speed of play, 




Some results suggest that numerical statistical risk warnings could be improved via 
qualitative information about the volatility of gambling. Specifically, a study has investigated 
the effects of adding the following “volatility statement” information to return-to-player or 
house-edge percentages (Newall et al., 2020c): 
“It takes millions of plays for a gambling game to tend towards its average return. A 
gambling game will not return a minimum value of prizes in any given period of gambling.” 
This additional text reduced gamblers’ perceived chances of winning in both the 
house-edge and return-to-player conditions, with the lowest perceptions occurring in the 
house-edge and volatility statement condition. House-edge information was again correctly 
understood better than return-to-player percentages (Newall et al., 2020c). This study 
suggests that improved statistical risk warnings in gambling could be constructed that 
communicate both the mean (house-edge) and variance (volatility) of the relevant distribution 
of payoffs. 
Graphs can often communicate risk better than numbers (Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 
2017). Some research has explored the possibility of proxying variations in return-to-player 
information on scratch cards with a star rating system (Walker, Stange, Dixon, Koehler, & 
Fugelsang, 2019). The study by Walker and colleagues found that participants put more 
weight on a star rating system of 1 - 5 stars when it was used instead of return-to-player 
percentages of 67.89% - 68.39% (with the 67.89% scratch card given one star, and the 
68.39% card given five stars). However, it is unclear as of yet how such a graphical rating 
system could be consistently applied across all non-skilled gambling games, given that a 
variation of 0.5% in the house-edge is relatively small, and in the abovementioned study was 





It has been argued that regulations intended to help inform consumers may be 
interpreted by firms in ways that do not genuinely help consumers (Page, 2019). Evidence 
from UK online casinos is consistent with this view. The UK gambling regulator requires 
online casinos to make “information that may reasonably be expected to enable the customer 
to make an informed decision about his or her chances of winning must be easily available 
[emphasis added]” (Gambling Commission, 2017). The return-to-player and the house-edge 
are two of the four allowed formats for providing this statistical risk information. As 
previously discussed, of these two, house-edge is better for consumers, although not 
necessarily the best of all statistical risk communication formats (Newall et al., 2020a). A 
field study of 363 online roulette games across 26 major UK online operators found that none 
used the house-edge, while a return-to-player warning label was found on 98.3% of games. 
Furthermore, 95.5% of return-to-player statements used the smallest font size on the screen, 
99.7% used the lowest level of text boldness from the screen, and 16.8% used acronyms in 
place of the term “return-to-player” (e.g., “RTP is 97.2973%”) (Newall, Walasek, Ludvig, & 
Rockloff, 2020). This suggests that current UK regulations are insufficient to ensure that 
statistical risk information is made sufficiently prominent and understandable to gamblers. 
There are two distinct ways that a gambler can be exposed to a high theoretical loss. 
The first way is to make bets at high house-edges. The second way is to bet at a lower house-
edge, but to bet so much money that the total amount of theoretical loss is still substantial. 
This second reason is why high-speed electronic gambling machines are considered a 
dangerous form of gambling (Schüll, 2012). Furthermore, electronic gambling machines 
involve the automatic reinvestment of winnings. In these games, say $100 could be inserted 
by the gambler, who could then easily bet much more than $100 total before losing 
everything, since intermediate wins are automatically reinvested into the account total. 




apply to the total amount bet, rather than the amount of money inserted (Harrigan, Brown, & 
Barton, 2017). This unique danger of repeat gambling games raises unique concerns for 
statistical risk warnings. 
Multiple possible interventions exist for electronic gaming machines. The UK 
government chose to reduce the maximum bet amounts on UK electronic gambling machines 
from £100 to £2 from April 2019, which might be effective, but does also reduce consumer 
freedoms (Casey, 2018). One possible freedom-preserving intervention would be to prevent 
the automatic reinvestment of winnings (Byrne & Russell, 2019), to reduce confusion about 
the relationship between theoretical loss and amount bet versus the amount of money 
inserted. This cash payout of winnings by default may further act as a potential nudge for 
gamblers to consider stopping gambling.  
In theory, an interactive display could be created for electronic gambling machines 
which dynamically calculates the entire statistical distribution of potential outcomes. This 
display could for example use data of the game’s house-edge, the gambler’s current bet size, 
and their betting frequency to forecast theoretical loss over different hypothetical session 
lengths. Furthermore, the display could be augmented to show the 95% confidence interval of 
possible results over this forecasted sequence of gambling, therefore providing a graphical 
measure of statistical volatility.  
Recommendations for future research 
One further remaining issue is the extent to which statistical risk warnings can modify 
gambling behaviour, rather than mere perceptions of winning. One Canadian study showed 
that the provision of more information on slot machines, including a categorical label for the 
house-edge (represented as “Hold %: very low/low/high/very high”), had little effect on 




have been affected by how this information was presented, including the usage of categorical 
groupings and the term hold percentage, which may not have been the clearest way of 
describing the underlying concept. Additional interventions, such as an interactive display, 
may have enhanced the efficacy of this warning label. 
Theoretical loss in skilled gambling 
The provision of statistical risk information is more complicated in skilled gambling 
games, where theoretical loss is also influenced by the gambler’s choices (Turner et al., 
2003). However, this added level of complexity also introduces an additional avenue via 
which gamblers can be directed toward lowering their theoretical loss. For example, the game 
of blackjack has a known “basic strategy”, which provides the lowest-loss play for any of the 
game’s potential states. Basic strategy is simple enough to be printed on a small card or 
leaflet, yet many regular blackjack players deviate from basic strategy sub-optimally. These 
deviations may cost regular gamblers large sums of money over time, and yet these gamblers 
can appear unwilling on their own to learn a simple and demonstrably better strategy 
(Wagenaar, 1988). Some gamblers in skilled games such as poker can in fact also produce 
theoretical gains (Sklansky & Malmuth, 1998). These skilled gamblers are not the intended 
subject of statistical risk warnings, as they have likely already mastered the underlying 
concepts. 
Given that each skilled gambling game has its own unique strategic considerations, 
the remainder of this section will focus on the economically important “fixed-odds” sports 
betting market. In fixed-odds sports betting a gambling operator (the bookmaker) posts a set 
of odds for an upcoming sports match ahead of time, setting the terms at which gamblers bet 
against the bookmaker (Buchdahl, 2003). Sports betting is a skilled gambling form, where the 




always tolerated by gambling operators, who tend to prevent profitable gamblers from betting 
(Kaunitz, Zhong, & Kreiner, 2017). Fixed-odds sports betting is established in the UK, is 
growing in Australia (Queensland Government, 2019), and could grow fast in the US given a 
recent Supreme Court ruling (Supreme Court of the United States, 2017). In the UK and 
Australia, sports betting has been associated with a high level of gambling marketing 
saturation (Newall et al., 2019). And of relevance to statistical risk warnings, fixed-odds 
sports betting is also associated with large and predictable variations in the house-edge. 
Current knowledge 
Two replicable patterns of variation in the house-edge in soccer betting have been 
found (Hassanniakalager & Newall, 2019). The first pattern is that bet types with more 
potential events are associated with higher house-edges. The second pattern is that bets with 
longer odds in some bet type are associated with larger house-edges than bets with shorter 
odds. Both patterns appear roughly additive (non-interacting), and both patterns mean that 
bets with longer odds are associated with higher house-edges.  
A soccer match has three main outcomes: home win, draw, away win. Bets on these 
outcomes, called “home-draw-away” here, are perhaps the most established type of soccer 
betting (Kuypers, 2000). But bookmakers also quote odds on more specific outcomes, such as 
the home team to win 1-0, 2-0, etc, called the “correct score” bet type here. The odds on any 
correct score bet must be longer than the odds of that team winning, since winning by a 
specific scoreline is a subset of the event of that team winning. If the odds quoted across 
these two bet types were equivalent, it should be possible to replicate the returns of a “home 
win” bet using only correct score bets (assuming that, in practice, only a finite number of 
scorelines can realistically occur). But this is not possible, as the odds quoted on correct score 




score bets, as shown either by odds inconsistencies (Newall, 2015; Newall, 2017), or betting 
simulations (Dixon, Mark J. & Pope, 2004; Hassanniakalager & Newall, 2019). This pattern 
has been observed across a broad range of soccer bet types (Ayton, 1997; Forrest, 2008; 
Newall, 2015; Newall, 2017). 
In a home-draw-away bet, one team will usually be predicted to be more likely to win 
the match (the “favorite”) and thus a bet of a fixed size on that team will come with a smaller 
potential payoff. The team with longer odds is called the “longshot”. In fixed-odds soccer 
betting, longshots are associated with higher house-edges than favorites (Buhagiar, Cortis, & 
Newall, 2018; Cain, Law, & Peel, 2003; Constantinou & Fenton, 2013; Deschamps & 
Gergaud, 2012; Graham & Stott, 2008; Hassanniakalager & Newall, 2019; Vlastakis, Dotsis, 
& Markellos, 2009). This pattern has broadly been found in other sports betting markets, 
perhaps most consistently in horse racing (Snowberg & Wolfers, 2010), although some 
exceptions exist (Vaughan Williams, 1999). This pattern has also been found in the odds 
quoted by a bookmaker on Twitter, in response to actual customer enquiries for custom bets 
(Newall, Walasek, Vázquez Kiesel, Ludvig, & Meyer, 2019). 
Variation in the house-edges across these different soccer bets is large, varying from a 
low of around 5% for home-draw-away bets (Newall, 2015), to highs of over 50% for certain 
bets at long odds (Hassanniakalager & Newall, 2019). This high degree of variation in the 
house-edge exceeds what can be found in any one non-skilled gambling form, providing a 
strong rationale for the provision of statistical risk warnings in sports betting. 
The preponderance of “odds advertising” in gambling advertising, where the odds on 
specific bets in relation to some upcoming sporting event are highlighted, is another reason to 
consider statistical risk warnings in sports betting (Newall et al., 2019). Odds advertising 




house-edges (Newall, 2015), with this tendency becoming more pronounced over time 
(Newall, Thobhani, Walasek, & Meyer, 2019). 
In fixed-odds sports betting, house-edges are variable, depending on market demand 
and supply. This is unlike most non-skilled gambling forms, where house-edges are fixed 
(e.g. at 2.7% for European roulette). This means that if a significant group of sports bettors 
can be nudged to be more responsive to price, then all sports bettors might conceivably 
benefit from greater market incentives to offer bets with more generous odds (and therefore 
lower house-edges). Home-draw-away bets, by example, have become much more fairly 
priced since the late 1990s, as this market has been transformed by internet gambling and 
regulatory changes (Forrest, 2008). Current house-edges on home-draw-away bets are 
nowadays roughly half (Buhagiar et al., 2018) their average value of 10.5% in the late 1990s 
(Kuypers, 2000).  
Product-specific issues 
In fixed-odds sports betting, the bookmaker posts a number of “odds” before each 
event corresponding to the risk/reward ratio of betting on various outcomes. Odds can be 
communicated in different ways, but they always translate into some implied probability of 
the event happening (Cortis, 2015). For example, the British fractional odds system uses two 
numbers, e.g. “3/1”, where the first number represents the profit from a successful bet of a 
stake of the second number. In the European decimal odds system, a single number is used to 
express the total return from a successful bet of stake $1. Decimal odds of 4 and fractional 
odds of 3/1 are equivalent, since both bets return a profit of $3 if successful (Cortis, 2015). 
Both of these odds can also be converted into an implied probability of 0.25. The 
bookmaker’s goal to prevent bettors from profiting is to set odds such that the implied 




Since fixed-odds sports betting involves forecasts of unique events, additional work 
and often assumptions are required to estimate the information relevant to statistical risk 
warnings (probabilities can be estimated with more certainty in non-skilled gambling games, 
such as roulette). The most certain method would be to use historical data from an industry 
operator, but these data are rarely shared with researchers (Cassidy, Loussouarn, & Pisac, 
2013). More approximate methods exist, which give largely similar results to each other. The 
first approximate method is simply to add up the implied probability from the odds for each 
potential event. The sum of implied probabilities will always exceed 1, which is necessary for 
a bookmaker that makes imperfect forecasts and which wants to set implied probabilities that 
are greater than actual probabilities for all events (Cortis, 2015). The excess of implied 
probabilities beyond 1 is called the “overround,” which can then be normalized to provide an 
estimate of the house-edge (Kuypers, 2000). This method has the benefit of being applicable 
even to single sporting events, but requires the assumption that bookmakers set odds in a 
defensive way (Stark & Cortis, 2017), so that they make a sure profit no matter which 
outcome occurs, which may not be true in practice (Levitt, 2004). Another approximate 
method is to simulate the returns from some betting strategy across a larger sample of past 
sporting events (Hassanniakalager & Newall, 2019). This method can simulate the returns 
under different assumptions of sports bettor behavior, but requires more historical data to 
work with, which may not necessarily provide the best estimate of current returns if the 
market has recently changed. 
One unresolved issue is how best to regulate the disclosure of house-edges in sports 
betting so as to preclude the incentive to game these disclosures. If bookmakers are given a 
range of potential calculation techniques, they would still have an incentive to use the 
technique that provides the lowest estimated house-edge. For example, if house-edges are 




reflect the current odds on offer, or temporarily increase their odds at the end of a reporting 
period to inflate how attractive their odds seem going forward. If house-edges are based on 
simulated betting returns, then bookmakers could potentially trial many simulations in-house, 
and use the simulation that again provided the lowest estimated house-edge.  
We believe that historical loss-rates given over some recent time period would be the 
most relevant to sports bettors. A standardized formula, which does not give operators any 
leeway to pick favourable subsets of data, seems the best approach. A fixed formula based on 
the last $x amount of money bet on a market (and corresponding $y amount lost, where y/x = 
the house-edge) appears robust to gaming, while providing incentives for bookmakers to 
maintain favourable odds. 
House-edge information could be applied for each separate bet type, since for 
example the house-edge is higher on correct score than home-draw-away bets in soccer. 
House-edge statements could also be applied to subsets of a given bet type, to reflect the fact 
that bets at longer odds tend to have higher house-edges. An overall figure could be given for 
correct score bets, for example, with an additional figure given for correct score bets at odds 
of 19/1 or longer. Such a statistical risk warning system would capture both predictable 
patterns of variations in the house-edge in soccer betting. 
Recommendations for future research 
We know of no previous studies that have explored the effect of statistical risk 
warnings on skilled gambling behaviour. Given the high and currently obscured variation in 
house-edges in fixed-odds sports betting, it is possible that risk warnings might be effective 
here. It may, however, prove difficult to change skilled gambling game behaviour, as non-
skilled gambling behaviour has thus far proven to be (Harrigan et al., 2017). It is also 




gambling form, produces similar illusions around the total amount of money bet as electronic 
gambling machines do (Harrigan et al., 2017). The potential for interactive displays should 
also be considered for skilled gambling. If a sports bettor chooses to make a potential bet size 
on a given bet, then a popup display could notify the bettor of the corresponding theoretical 
loss, rather than requiring the bettor to estimate this value based on their bet size and 
displayed house-edge.  
The provision of historical house-edges would also benefit sports betting researchers, 
who generally do not have access to industry data (Cassidy et al., 2013). At present, research 
in this area involves a number of steps and approximating assumptions which would not be 
necessary with the mandatory disclosure of detailed historical house-edge information. This 
would help researchers’ attempts to replicate findings across different sports betting markets. 
Better access to data would also speed up the process of understanding the determinants of 
gamblers’ losses in other skill-based gambling games. 
Discussion 
Many researchers recommend treating gambling as a public health issue (Bowden-
Jones et al., 2019; Browne et al., 2016; Orford, 2019; van Schalkwyk et al., 2019; Wardle et 
al., 2019). Statistical risk warnings emphasising theoretical loss are, like standard drink or 
calorie labelling, only one potential element to a public health approach to gambling. But as 
in alcohol and food, they could play a useful and minimally-invasive role in conjunction with 
other health promotion initiatives (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2007). Improving current 
statistical risk warnings, and introducing novel and comparable statistical risk warnings for 
additional gambling products, could help gamblers to make better informed product choices. 
Information about either the theoretical loss or the house-edge can provide gamblers with a 




transparent pricing information could foster price competition between operators with 
potential longer-term benefits to gamblers. 
Just like a public health approach to alcohol or other risky products, we recommend 
that any implementation of statistical risk warnings should be considered alongside other 
potential interventions, such as more restrictive changes to the gambling product experience 
(Byrne & Russell, 2019; Palmer du Preez, Landon, Bellringer, Garrett, & Abbott, 2016; 
Stevens & Livingstone, 2019), attempts to improve gamblers’ decision making skills more 
broadly (Broussard & Wulfert, 2019; Williams & Connolly, 2006), personalized 
interventions for those who have suffered high losses (Jonsson, Hodgins, Munck, & 
Carlbring, 2019), and product-specific warnings for uniquely harmful products (Ginley et al., 
2017). 
The specific format and presentation of warning messages can profoundly affect 
consumer responses (Bar-Gill, 2019). Therefore, policymakers should be sure to implement 
current best practices in format and presentation. Potential industry responses to warning 
message requirements are another reason for policymakers to enforce best practices. It has 
been argued that many firms might do the minimum to comply with the letter rather than the 
spirit of regulations intended to help inform consumers (Page, 2019). Evidence from warning 
labels in UK online casinos is consistent with this view (Newall et al., 2020). Statistical risk 
warnings in sports betting could similarly be undermined, if operators are allowed freedom 
around the presentation or selection of statistical information.  
Although we have argued for theoretical loss as the key statistical issue around 
gambling products, economists also highlight how the volatility of returns can also impact 
consumer welfare. That is, even if losses to operators were removed, highly volatile games 




losing their total stake. Even in the case of zero net group losses, diminishing marginal 
welfare benefits derived from wins means that net harm can accrue to gamblers. It has been 
noted that gamblers tend to bet smaller amounts on high-variance bets, perhaps as a natural 
reaction to this aspect of product risk (Feess, Müller, & Schumacher, 2014). Although 
relevant to consumer welfare, the volatility issue is unlikely to counteract product labelling 
around theoretical loss/the house-edge, given that higher-variance products also tend to have 
higher house-edges (Turner, 2011). However, the volatility of gambling products is a unique 
issue that requires further research (Newall et al., 2020c). 
Any enhanced consumer disclosure does run the risk of either unintended 
consequences (Bar-Gill, 2019) or “backfire” effects (Stibe & Cugelman, 2016). Standard 
drink alcohol labels may for example be used by teenagers to consume as much alcohol as 
possible given their budget (Wells, Graham, & Purcell, 2009). In statistical risk warnings for 
gambling products, there is according to one argument a potential indirect route for 
backfiring. All else equal, gambling products with lower house-edges allow gamblers to go 
on longer winnings runs. Since problem gamblers tend to remember big wins, it has been 
argued that lower house-edge gambling products might therefore be the most harmful to 
gamblers (Harrigan & Dixon, 2010). In the present context, this consideration suggests that 
improved statistical risk warnings might shift gamblers and operators toward lower house-
edge products, which may then cause more harm due to an increased rate of winning streaks. 
Although the relationship between the house-edge and winning streaks is true, this argument 
does neglect other relevant considerations. Loss chasing is another aspect of problem 
gambling (Ferris & Wynne, 2001; Zhang & Clark, 2020), and lower house-edge products 
should also induce a lesser need to chase losses, which should also reduce harm. Backfire 
effects could plausibly happen through a number of channels, however, so due caution should 




Further research should continue to explore the various product-specific issues 
surrounding statistical risk warnings. Continuous gambling products such as electronic 
gambling machines allow for money to be bet repeatedly, which can cause confusion around 
the total amount of money staked (Harrigan et al., 2017). This confusion could potentially be 
corrected in a number of ways. Preventing the automatic reinvestment of winnings is one 
potential method (Byrne & Russell, 2019). Another method could be to create an interactive 
display forecasting a gambler’s theoretical loss and corresponding 95% confidence interval of 
potential returns based on their current machine settings (stake level, betting frequency etc.). 
For sports betting a more pressing issue might be studies exploring the extent to which sports 
bettors’ choices are modified when house-edge information is given for different bet types. 
 Conclusion and recommendation 
Although more research is always beneficial, we will make the following 
recommendations based on the evidence so far. Jurisdictions that currently disclose the 
return-to-player on non-skilled gambling games should benefit from switching to the house-
edge, and by making this information more prominent. House-edge information should also 
be beneficial in sports betting, and should be provided both at point of use and in sports 
betting marketing. Statistical risk warnings can be a useful input to a multifaceted public 
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